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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 880546-CA

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

:
Category No. 2

PATRICK DEAN COANDO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the Eighth
District Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah,
denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
made July 9, 1988, at defendant's sentencing hearing.

This

appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and (h) (1971),
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the State's jurisdiction was proper in this
matter because an essential element of each aspect of defendant's
offense of issuing bad checks was committed on property within
the State's jurisdiction?
2. Whether defendant may properly be considered to be
an Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction and
whether Roosevelt, Utah may properly be considered to be part of
federally recognized Indian Country?

3. Whether defendant's crimes must be punished as a
class B misdemeanor at the very minimum?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982):
Except as otherwise provided in sections
1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian
country," as used in this chapter, means (a)
all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the boarders of the United
States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
18 U.S.C. S 1152 (1982)1
Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the general laws of the United States as
to the punishment of offenses committed in
any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the
Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses
committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian
committing any offense in the Indian country
who; has been punished by the local law of
the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses is or may be secured to the
Indian tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. S 1153 (1982)t
Any Indian who commits against the person
or property of another Indian or other person
any of the following offenses, namely,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape,
carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife,
who has not attained the age of sixteen
years, assault with intent to commit rape,
-2-

incest, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault
resulting in serious bodily injury, arson,
burglary, robbery, and larceny, within the
Indian country, shall be subject to the same
laws and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
As used in this section, the offenses of
burglary and incest shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the
State in which such offense was committed as
are in force at the time of such offense.
In addition to the offenses of burglary and
incest, any other of the above offenses which
are not defined and punished by Federal law
in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the
State in which such offense was committed as
are in force at the time of such offense.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-201 (1978):
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in
this state for an offense which he commits,
while either within or outside the state, by
his own conduct or that of another for which
he is legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either
wholly or partly within the state; or
(b) The conduct outside the state
constitutes an attempt to commit an
offense within the state; or
(c) The conduct outside the state
constitutes a conspiracy to commit an
offense within the state and an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in
the state; or
(d) The conduct within the state
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy to commit in another
jurisdiction an offense under the laws of
both this state and such other
jurisdiction.
(2) An offense is committed partly within
this state if either the conduct which is an
element of the offense, or the result which
is such an element, occurs within this state.
In homicide the "result" is either the
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physical contact which causes death, or the
death itself; and if the body of a homicide
victim is found within the state, the death
shall be presumed to have occurred within the
state,
(3) An offense which is based on an omission
to perform a duty imposed by the law of this
state is committed within the state
regardless of the location of the offender at
the time of the omission.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1988)
(1) Any person who issues or passes a
check or draft for the payment of money, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money,
property, or other thing of value or paying
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee,
is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person
who issues a check or draft for which payment
is refused by the drawee is presumed to know
the check or draft would not be paid if he
had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a
check or draft for the payment of money, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, corporation, any money,
property, or other thing of value or paying
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of
issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to
make good and actual payment to the payee in
the amount of the refused check or draft
within 14 days of his receiving actual notice
of the check or draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or
draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of
checks or drafts made or drawn in this
state within a period not exceeding six
months amounts to a sum of not more than
$200, such offense shall be a class B
misdemeanor.
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(b) If the check or draft or checks or
drafts made or drawn in this state within
a period not exceeding six months amounts
to a sum exceeding $200 but not more than
$300, such offense shall be a class A
misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or
drafts made or drawn in this state within
a period not exceeding six months amounts
to a sum exceeding $300 but not more than
$1,000, such offense shall be a felony of
the third degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or
drafts made or drawn in this state within
a period not exceeding six months amounts
to a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense
shall be a second degree felony.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 26, 1987, defendant was charged with the
crime of issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953, as amended) (R. 2 ) .
Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge on November 23,
1987, before the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for
Duchesne County, the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, presiding (R.
98).

Subsequent to the guilty plea, defendant entered into a

plea in abeyance agreement (R. 99). On April 25, 1988, defendant
was found to have violated the agreement and a judgement of
guilty was entered (R. 60-61).

At an order to show cause hearing

held on July 19, 1988, defendant made a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied and sentence was
imposed (R. 133-34, 150-51).

Notice of appeal by defendant was

filed on August 5, 1988 (R. 74).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
An amended information was filed by the Duchesne County
Attorney in the Seventh Circuit Court of the State of Utah,
Duchesne County, Roosevelt Department on October 26, 1987, which
charged defendant with the crime of issuing bad checks, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953,
as amended) (R. 2). The crimes were alleged to have been
committed at Roosevelt, Duchesne County, Utah and Vernal, Uintah
County, Utah (R. 2). Seven checks were written to the
establishments of Safeway, Tri-Mart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle
Oil, at a total amount of $354.26 (R. 2). Defendant pled guilty
to these charges on November 23, 1987 and an abeyance agreement
was entered into, under which defendant was to make restitution
payments and to refrain from any other similar conduct or legal
violations (R. 87, 98).
On April 25, 1988, defendant was found to have violated
the agreement for failure to make the required restitution
payments and issuing additional bad checks (R. 60-61).
Subsequently, the plea in abeyance was set aside and judgment was
entered on the guilty plea (R. 61).
On July 19, 1988, the Eighth Judicial District Court
heard an order to show cause why the previously given probation
should not be revoked and why the sentence previously suspended
should not be imposed (R. 132). Defendant moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that defendant is a Uintah
Indian and the offenses were committed on the Uintah-Ouray
Reservation (R. 134-35).

Defendant proffered only his own

testimony in support of his assertions (R. 135).
-6-

Defendant testified that although his permanent address
was a post office box in Vernal, Utah, he resided wherever his
job took him (R. 136). He also testified that he and five other
Indians have a casing company called F.A.C.S. (R. 137). Further,
defendant explained that his father is full-blooded Shoshoni
Indian, his mother is enrolled in the Uintah Band, and defendant,
himself, was one-fourth shoshoni and three-eighths Uintah Indian
(R. 137).
Upon cross-examination, defendant maintained that he
was a Uintah Indian and that he possessed enrollment cards from
the Uintah and Wind River (Shoshoni) Reservations (R. 140).
However, no enrollment cards were produced, or admitted into
evidence (R. 142, 43). On cross-examination defendant also
admitted that Vernal Drug is located on State ground (R. 141).
After hearing defendant's proffers, the Eighth Judicial
District Court denied defendant's motion, finding that the
evidence did not support defendant's claim that he is an enrolled
member of the Ute Indian Tribe (R. 146). Additionally, the court
noted that some of the bad checks were written on State land and
all of the checks were drawn on a bank which is not on the
reservation (R. 146-47).

Defendant was sentenced to the Utah

State Prison for a term not to exceed five years (R. 151).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's jurisdiction in this matter was proper
regardless of defendant's assertion that he is an Indian for
federal jurisdictional purposes and the offenses occurred in
Indian Country.

Essential elements of each bad check offense
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that of the drawee's refusal of payment, occurred at the First
Interstate Bank of Vernal, which is located within the State's
jurisdiction.

Statutory law in Utah and case law in sister

jurisdictions supports the State's assertion of jurisdiction in
matters such as the instant case.

Thus, this Court need not

reach the issue of whether defendant is an Indian.
Alternatively, defendant's proffered evidence failed to
establish that he is recognized as an Indian for federal criminal
jurisdiction purposes.

His illogical testimony concerning his

Indian blood heritage and failure to offer credible evidence
concerning his recognition by the tribe as an Indian support the
court's conclusion that defendant failed to meet his burden in
establishing himself as an Indian.

The State also reasserts that

the City of Roosevelt, Utah is not part of the Uintah-Ouray
Reservation based upon its arguments in the case of State v.
Perank which are currently under advisement before the Utah
Supreme Court.

The State submits that this Court should at least

refrain from a determination of the issue until the Supreme Court
has ruled.
Finally, if this Court accepts defendant's arguments
and finds that the State's jurisdiction was improperly exercised
in this case, the State submits that defendants' criminal acts
roust at least be punishable by the State as a class B
misdemeanor.

Defendant has pled guilty to issuing these bad

checks, two of which, totalling $70.00 were passed on state land
in every element of the offense.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION
REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE IS
AN INDIAN AND THE ILLEGAL ACTS TOOK PLACE IN
INDIAN COUNTRY.
Defendant's claims that jurisdiction in this matter
should properly be before the Ute Tribal Court or in an
appropriate Federal Court is based on his assertions that he is
an Indian and the crimes took place on an Indian Reservation.
(See Br. of App. at 4.)

However, whether defendant may legally

be recognized as an Indian and whether certain localities such as
Roosevelt, Utah are part of Indian Country need not be addressed
by this Court.

Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§

76-1-201 (1978) and 76-6-505 (1988).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978) directs:
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in
this state for an offense which he commits,
while either within or outside the state, by
his own conduct or that of another for which
he is legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed
either wholly or partly within the
state;
(2) An offense is committed partly within
this state if either the conduct which is an
element of the offense, or the result which
is such an element, occurs within this state.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-505 (1988) defines the elements of the
crime of issuing a bad check or draft as follows:
(1) Any person who issues or passes a
check or draft for the payment of money, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money,
property, or other thing of value or paying
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
-9-

rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee,
is guilty of a issuing a bad check or draft.
(Emphasis added.)

Therefore, according to these statutes, the

State may correctly claim jurisdiction over a charge of issuing
bad checks if any of the elements of the crime, i.e. (1) passing
the check; (2) knowing that the check will not be honored; and
(3) refusal by the drawee to pay, have been committed within the
State.
Defendant's guilty plea, entered November 23, 1987, to
the third degree felony of issuing bad checks in an amount
exceeding $300 but less than $1,000 (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6505(3)(c) (1988)) is based upon seven checks written to Safeway,
Tri-Kart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle Oil (R. 2). Although some of
these establishments are located in Roosevelt (which defendant
argues is on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservations) (see Brief
of App. at 5-6), the First Interstate Bank of Vernal, drawee of
each of these bad checks, is clearly within state jurisdiction
because Vernal, Uintah County, Utah, is not part of Indian
Country.

Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072,

1188, aff'd in part, reversed in part, 716 F.2d 1298, on
rehearing, 773 F.2d 1087, cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986).
Therefore, although there may be elements of the crime that
occurred on land arguably part of Indian Country, the element of
the drawee refusing payment occurred on land that is definitely
not in Indian country.

Accordingly, § 76-1-201 directs that

defendant is subject to prosecution within the State regardless
of his assertions that he is an Indian and the checks passed to
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businesses in Roosevelt, Utah were located on land subject to
federal jurisdiction.
In the recent case of State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150
(Wash. 1989), the Supreme Court of Washington considered whether
the State of Washington had jurisdiction to try three defendants
on charges of aggravated first degree murder when the victim was
killed at Fort Lewis, Washington, land held under exclusive
federal jurisdiction.

771 P.2d at 1151.

The court concluded

that the "State of Washington may exercise jurisdiction over a
criminal offense if an essential element of the offense occurred
within the state but outside the land ceded to the federal
government (where the offense culminated)."

Id.

at 1152.

Washington's statutory language mirrors the statutory language of
Utah previously quoted.

Specifically, RCW

9A.04.030(1) (1988)

states that "[t]he following persons are liable for punishment:
(1) A person who commits in the state any crime, in whole or in
part."

The court explained that an offense "is committed 'in

part' in Washington, within the contemplation of the criminal
jurisdiction statute, when an 'essential element' of the offense
has been committed here."

771 P.2d at 1153-54; citing, State v.

Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 690-92, 66 P.2d 836 (1937); State v.
Swanson, 16 Wash.App. 179, 180, 554 P.2d 364 (1976), review
denied, 88 Wash.2d 1014, cert, denied, 434 U.S. 967, (1977).
In the Washington case, the State conceded that "the
fatal wounds were inflicted, and the victim's death occurred, in
this area of exclusive federal jurisdiction."

771 P.2d at 1153.

However, the State asserted that the element of "premeditation"

• i i -

occurred within the State's jurisdiction, and that this element
was an essential component of the charge.

Ld.

The Supreme Court

of Washington agreed:
premeditation is an element separate and
distinct from the specific intent to kill
required for first degree murder; it also
distinguishes first degree murder from second
degree murder. The failure of the state to
sufficiently establish premeditation has been
held to require reversal of a conviction for
aggravated first degree murder. Clearly,
therefore, premeditation constitutes an
essential element of the crime of aggravated
first degree murder.
It follows from the foregoing, that if the
State makes a sufficient showing to establish
that premeditation occurred in this state
outside Fort Lewis before the infliction of
the fatal wounds at Fort Lewis, then the
State of Washington has jurisdiction to try
petitioners for the crime of aggravated first
degree murder.
771 P.2d at 1154-55.

In the case at hand, the element of the

crime of issuing bad checks that the drawee refused payment is
essential because without the final step of refusal of payment by
the drawee, the crime of issuing bad checks does not occur.

If

the bank actually made payment, or the establishment never
tendered the check for payment, an essential element would be
lacking and the defendant could not be found guilty of the
offense.
In the instant case, this essential element of the
crime was completed.

With the First Interstate Bank of Vernal's

refusal of payment, defendant's offense reached fruition.

The

State's jurisdiction over defendant should be affirmed according
to S 76-1-201 because this offense was committed "partly within
the state."

For this reason, it is irrelevant whether defendant
-12-

is an Indian or whether some other elements of the crime occurred
on the Reservation and this Court need not address either of
these issues.
POINT II
THE STATE PROPERLY ASSERTED ITS JURISDICTION
OVER DEFENDANT IN THAT THE CRIMES DID NOT
OCCUR IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT HAS NOT
SATISFIED THE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF PROVING HIMSELF AN INDIAN.
As defendant points out in his brief, whether exclusive
federal criminal jurisdiction exists depends upon two prongs (See
Brief of App. at 5.)

These prongs are whether the criminal acts

occurred in "Indian Country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1976) and whether defendant may be found to be "Indian" for
purposes of jurisdiction under federal law.

See United States v.

Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-64 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied,
444 U.S. 859 (1980).

Defendant failed to establish either of

these prongs, and, if this court reaches these issues, it may
still find that jurisdiction was properly asserted by the State.
A.

Roosevelt, Utah IB Not Located In Indian Country.

This issue has previously been extensively briefed and
argued in the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clinton Perank, Case
No. 860196.
11, 1988.

The Court took Perank under advisement on October

This Court may wish to refrain from ruling on this

issue, should it become necessary to address the issue, until the
Supreme Court has ruled.

In any event, Appendix A contains the

State's argument on this issue in the Perank case.

The State

reasserts the argument in this Court that Roosevelt is not in
Indian country and incorporates Appendix A as its analysis of the
issue.

B.

Defendant Failed To Make The Necessary Showing That
He Is An Indian For Purposes of Exclusive Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction.

While 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 preclude state
criminal jurisdiction over "Indians" who commit crimes on Indian
reservations, defendant cannot avail himself of that defense
because he did not meet his evidentiary burden to establish that
he is an Indian.

The testimony of defendant at the Order to Show

Cause Hearing on July 19, 1988 concerning his status as an Indian
consisted of the following:
Q

(by Defense) And are you an Indian?

A

Yes, I am

Q

What is your affiliation?

A: My father in [sic] one-half--my father in
[sic] one full--he is four-fourths Shoshoni
Indian off the Wind River Reservation, and
I'm one-fourth Shoshoni off the Wind River
Reservation. My mother is enrolled in the
Uintah Band over here on the Ute—what they
call the Ute Tribe Reservation, but she is in
the Uintah Band, and so am I. I'm threeeights Uintah Indian.
Q:

Does the tribe recognize you as a member?

A:

They do.

(R. 137.)
This testimony fails to offer any objective proof of
defendant's recognition by any tribe, such as enrollment cards
which were never produced or offered into evidence, or the
testimony of any other tribal members or authorities.

Further,

defendant's testimony is internally inaccurate and is, therefore,
incredible.

Defendant testified that his father is full-blooded

Shoshoni Indian, yet defendant states he is only one-fourth
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Shoshoni.

He also states that he is three-eighths Uintah Indian.

Presumably this would make defendant's mother three-quarters
Uintah Indian and leave her one-quarter unknown to this court.
If defendant's father is, in fact, full-blooded Shoshoni and his
mother is three-quarters Uintah and one-quarter unknown,
defendant should logically be one-half Shoshoni, three-eighths
Uintah and one-eighth unknown.

However, defendant's incredible

assertions are that he is one-quarter Shoshoni, three-eighths
Uintah, leaving another three-eighths unknown.

By his

description, his largest tribal claim by blood, the Shoshoni
tribe, has become the smallest blood connection.
Aside from these inaccuracies, defendant only asserted
that "the tribe" recognized him as a member.
which tribe he was referring to.

He did not specify

Surely, defendant cannot claim

that because the Shoshoni tribe recognizes him, the Ute Tribe has
jurisdiction over his actions on the Ute Reservation.
defendant was asked by the court if he had

When

any further evidence

or testimony to present, he simply reasserted his position that
"the facts state for themselves [defendant] is a member of the
Uintah Band, that the incidents alleged took place on the
reservation, and that according to federal Indian law the court
is without jurisdiction."

(R. 143). He did not present a Wind

River enrollment card even though he earlier stated that he had
such a card with him.

Nor did he present a Ute enrollment card.

That evidence does not qualify defendant as an Indian
for purposes of avoiding state jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§
1152 and 1153. As a preeminent authority on Indian law has
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stated:

"Several important Indian statutes, such as the federal

criminal jurisdiction statutes [citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and
1153] . . . use the word "Indian" without further definition. . .
[T]he courts have taken the position in this situation that
the term 'Indian' means an individual who has Indian blood and
who is regarded as an Indian by his or her tribe or Indian
community."

F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 24 (1982

ed.) (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).

Defendant's

evidence leaves in doubt his status vis-a-vis the Tribe.
"Tribal membership as determined by the Indian tribe or
community itself is often an essential element.

In fact, a

person of complete Indian ancestry who has never had relations
with any Indian tribe may be considered a non-Indian for some
legal purposes."

Ld. at 19 (footnote omitted).

"Some people

therefore can be an Indian for one purpose but not for another."
Id. at 26. And Cohen specifies that one who is an "Indian" for
some purposes may not necessarily qualify to avoid state criminal
jurisdiction.

Id.

"[T]wo elements must be satisfied before it can be
found that the appellant is an Indian under federal law. . . [He
must have] a significant percentage of Indian blood . . . [and
he] must be recognized as an Indian either by the federal
government or by some tribe or society of Indians."
Oklahoma, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982).

Goforth v.
In that case,

"[t]he record [was] devoid . . . of any evidence tending to show
that the appellant was recognized as an Indian.

Absent such

recognition, we cannot hold that [he] is an Indian under federal

law . . . ."

Ld.

Since the appellant was not an Indian under 18

U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 # those statutes did not preempt state
jurisdiction.

Id.

Having failed to establish the nature and extent of any
relationship he may have with the tribe, defendant in this case
also has not shown that he is an Indian.
therefore was not preempted.

iCf.

Utah's

jurisdiction

New Mexico v. Cutnose, 532

P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct.App. 1974) ("The

jurisdictional

was to a court exercising general jurisdiction. . . .

challenge
The burden

was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the
district court.")

Since he sought to invoke a special exception

to the State's jurisdiction, he was the moving party and had the
burden of producing prima facie evidence that he is an Indian.
Such facts were peculiarly available to defendant.

He,

far more easily than the State, could produce evidence of his
tribal relations.

Indeed, the State otherwise would have to try

to prove a negative (i.e., that defendant is not an Indian), and
would have to meet that difficult burden in more or less an
evidentiary vacuum, on nothing more than the defendant's bald
allegation.

Defendant, had the burden of going torward with

sufficient evidence to show prima facie that he is an Indian.
"The party who asserts a fact has the burden t
es t. ab 1 J sh t hf» I acf
541, 546 (1965).

"

Yeazell v. Copins , 98 A M Z . 1 09

J

P 2d

"The ordinary rule, based on considerations of

fairness, does not place the burden upo*

litigant to establish

facts pecul I airly wi tl i i i i 1:1 :ie ki iow] e<

. \ -• adversary. "

States v.

New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5
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United

(1957); Browzin v. Catholic University, 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).

In other words, "the party in the best position to

present the requisite evidence should bear the burden of proof .
. .,"

United States v. Continental Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964

(11th Cir. 1985), and "[t]he party with the best knowledge
normally sustains the burden."

Lindahl v. Office of Personnel

Management, 776 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
If defendant did not have the burden of production, the
State would have the extreme burden of proving a negative, which
burden the law does not favor.

Trans-American Van Service v.

U.S., 421 F.Supp. 308, 331 (N.D. Tex. 1976).

And the State would

have to prove that negative without the defendant's having to
make any evidentiary showing whatever.

"In that situation it

would not make too much sense to thrust upon the [State] the
burden of disproving the truth of the bare [allegation]."
Lindahl, 776 F.2d at 780.
United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1983),
illustrates the principle that a criminal defendant has the
initial burden on whether or not he is an Indian.

That case,

like the instant one, involved 18 U.S.C. S 1152.

Hester argued

against federal jurisdiction because the statute's coverage does
"not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against . . .
another Indian" and the indictment had not alleged Hester's nonIndian status.

Iji. at 1042.

The Government argued that it did not have the "burden
of alleging and establishing the non-applicability of this
exception to S 1152.M

Id.

The court agreed, citing, McKelvey v.
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United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) ("it is incumbent on one
who relies on such an exception to set it up and establish it").
As the court correctly noted, "It is far more manageable for the
defendant to shoulder the burden of producing evidence that he is
a member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the
Government to produce evidence that he is not. . . . "
F.2d 1043.

Iji. at 719

The Government does not have "the burden of going

forward on that issue."

Id.

Similar analysis, although under a different (civil)
statute, prevailed in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592
F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).

The

court held against the tribe's position on burden of proof, in
part because the tribe's opponent otherwise would "have to try to
prove a negative."

Jd. at 590.

In this case, defendant is the party who would benefit
from proof that he is an Indian, and he therefore has the burden
of establishing that fact.

In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation,

560 F.Supp. 1006, 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1982).

We acknowledge that the

State ultimately has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3),

but that does not alter

defendant's burden of producing evidence in the first instance to
2
establish prima facie that he is an Indian.
If he meets the
Section 76-1-501(3) states: "The existence of jurisdiction and
venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established by
a preponderance of the evidence."
2
That the State has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction
does not necessarily mean it has the burden of going forward on
that issue. Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc. 537 F.Supp. 730,
735 (N.D. Va. 1982). Section 76-1-501(3) leaves it to the court
to delineate whose burden it is to go forward with evidence in a
-19-

burden, "then the ultimate burden of proof remains, of course,
upon the Government."

Hester, 719 F.2d at 1043.

The State did not have the burden of refuting
defendant's "Indian-status" allegation until he had given it a
full prima facie basis in fact. And the record shows defendant
failed to present evidence on all facts necessary to make a prima
facie showing.
POINT III
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT ACCEPTS DEFENDANT'S
CLAIMS THAT THE OFFENSE OCCURRED IN INDIAN
COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN FOR
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES, THE PROPER
REMEDY IS TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR.
Initially, the State reasserts it's position that the
State's jurisdiction was proper in the instant case because an
essential element of each illegally passed check occurred in
Vernal, Utah, which is off of the reservation.

Alternatively,

the State maintains that no elements of the offense occurred in
Indian Country and defendant has not established himself as an
Indian for purposes of federal jurisdiction.

However, if this

court accepts defendant's claims, defendant's offense of issuing
bad checks, to which he entered a guilty plea on November 23,

2
Cont. particular case, and that burden may shift with the
circumstances. "[T]here is not and cannot be any one general
solvent for [allocating] the burden of proof in all cases. It is
merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in
the different situations." Mashpee Tribe, 592 F.2d at 589 n.13,
quoting, 9 Wigmore on Evidence, S 2486, p, 274 (3d ed. 1940)
(bracketed word in the court's opinion). In some cases, the
State may have the burden of production as well as the burden of
persuasion, but not here. Fairness and efficiency require that
the Indian criminal defendant have the burden of production on
his Indian status.
•20-

1987, should be punished as a class B misdemeanor.

Two checks,

one for $20 and one for $50, were passed to Vernal Drug (R. 2).
This establishment, as defendant admits, is not located on the
reservation.

(See Brief of App. at 5-6.)

Therefore, according

to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-201 and 76-6-505, the State's assertion
of jurisdiction over the offenses committed in Vernal, Utah is
proper and defendant should be punished for the commission of a
class B misdemeanor at the very least.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to uphold the jurisdiction of the District Court and affirm
defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^

*A day of June, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

/ /

/ SANDRA h< ^SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

Basin.

And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be

said that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections
1152 and 1153 was not established below.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE OFFENSE WAS WOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
Perank claims his crime was committed within Indian country

as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allegation that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of
jurisdiction.

The following section of this brief will demon-

strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished
and today consists only of "trust lands,99 and Perank9s offense
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished.

This

is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation
which show that it has been disestablished.
A.

General Principles Governing Disestablishment
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263),

as amended, a Presidential Proclamation Issued on July 14, 1905
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the
public domain and opened for public settlement under the homestead and townslte laws.

It is settled law that some surplus

land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe

v, Knelp, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)f and DeCoteau v. Dlatrict County
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and other aurplua land acta did not,
•ee, e.qf, Mattr v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), and Seymour v,
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69.

Aa explained in Solem, the Supreme Court has eatabliahed a "fairly clean analytical etructure" for diatinguiahing those aurplus
land acta that of their ovn force effected an immediate diminishment of the reaervation from thoae acta that aimply permitted
non-Indians to purchaae land within an exiating reservation and
left to another day the actual redrawing of its boundaries (id.
at 470). Because Appellant does no more than submit the decision
of the en banc majority to support his contention that the crime
took place in Indian country, ve Bust examine that decision in
light of controlling Supreme Court precedents.
1.

The £n banc majorityfs decision in Ute Indian Tribe that

the hiatoric reservations were not disestablished ultimately
reata on the proposition that restoration to public domain Ian*
guage ia not the same as a congreasional state of mind to disestabliah and does not reliably eatablish the clear and uneqpjivocal
evidence of Congress1 intent to change boundaries.

In so hold*

ing, the majority acknowledged that this had not been the law
prior to Solem and, indeed, all of the judgea who had considered
this caae before Solem agreed that such language vaa aynonymous
with diaestabliahment.

See Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1303

(panel opinion); IdL. at 1316 (Doyle, J., dissenting); and 521
P.Supp. at 1122 (dlatrict court opinion).

To the en banc major*

lty, however, Solem altered this long-standing principle of

interpretation and Barked a new direction in the Supreme Courtfs
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reservations.

Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u)nder the

Soles standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any
of the congressional enactments in question1*.

Ute Indian Tribe,

773 F.2d at 1090-91.
The majority's reading of Solem is not correct.

Solem did

not establish new "standards" and it did not alter the principles
announced in Seymour, Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud, which the
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean
0

analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established
reservation boundaries."

465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court

has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 & n.12), the
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that congressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586, and
iolem, 465 U.S. at 470-71).
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation.
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587*

Zn each of the disestablishment cases

decided before Solem, the Court expressly acknowledged that restoration to public domain constitutes firm and unequivocal language of disestablishment.

See Rosebud, 430 U.S. st 589 & n.5;

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. st 426-27, 446; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504, n.22;
Seymour, 368 U.S. st 354-55; and United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442, 445-46 (1914).

In the clearest possible terms, the

Court stated that restoration to the public domain meant
"stripped of reservation status.11

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446.

The decisions in Rosebud and Decoteau fairly reflect the view
of the Court on this point.

Although in both cases the Court was

divided on the question whether the particular area involved had
retained reservation status, the Court was unanimous that such
restoration language amounted to a unequivocal expression of an
intent to disestablish.

See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589, n.5; id.

at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27,
446; id. st 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

Indeed, Justice

Harshall--who wrote the Court's opinion in Solem—observed in his
dissenting opinion in Rosebud that an 1889 surplus land act expressly restoring lands to the public domain (25 Stat. 896, sec.
21) was "yet another example91 of "•clear language of express termination. . . f ." Id^, 430 U.S. St 618.
Solem did not reject or titer this firmly-established rule of
interpretation.

The crucial provision interpreted in Solem did

not provide for the restoration of the surplus lands to the
public domain, nor was any such language contained in the operative portions of the Solem legislation.

Instead, s reference to

"public domain" appeared in s subsequent section providing that

tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the
opened lands, •only as long as the land remained part of the
public domain."

Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged

that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablishment; it found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated,"
it could not be dispositive.

Solem, 465 U.S. at 475*

In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in
using,.." public domain terminology in the Solera legislation
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the
'public domain9 Inasmuch as they were available for settlement91
(id,, 465 U.S. at 475, n.17).

It is evident, however, that the

Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain
language in every other instance.

The Court had already indi-

cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its comments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a drastic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of
such restoration language.
The en banc majority's decision to the contrary also over*
looks the Solem Court's later observation, in the context of
subsequent jurisdictional history, that:
Unentered lands were considered a part of the
reservation. They were available for allotment to
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of

the tribe, end they ysre specifically defined as
different from land in public domain.
Id. at 480, n.25 (emphasis added), quoting F. Hoxie, Jurisdiction
on the Cheyenne River Reservation:

An Analysis of the Causes and

Consequences of the Act of May 29, 1908, at 87 (undated).

The

reference to public domain In the quoted passage can only be
understood on the basis that public domain and reservation status
are mutually exclusive.!£/

In short, Solem does not signal the

Supreme Court's abandonment of its previous interpretations of
restoration to public domain language.

Such language continues

to be the clearest expression of disestablishment.
2.

Although Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v.

Klamath Indian Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 3420 (1985),12/ required that the
various acts Involved here--vhich contain identical operative
language—should be interpreted to have the same effect, the en
banc majority did not do so and thereby compounded its error.

In

this regard, there was no dispute that the so-called "Gilsonite

16. This is how the author of the quoted study understood
It, as he considered public domain status to be crucial in interpreting the subsequent jurisdictional treatment of the area involved. See Hoxie, supra, at 87, 88. Thus, he stated that it
was necessary to determine whether the area in question was "administered as part of the public domain. . . .* Id., at 87.
17. In that case, the issue was whether that Tribe retained
treaty hunting and fishing rights in an area ceded under a 1901
cession agreement. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422. In interpreting this
agreement, the Court Initially looked to the construction given a
prior treaty with the same Tribe containing similar cession Ian*
guage. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422, 3428. As the Court there explained, *[p]reeumptively, the similar language used in the 1901
Cession Agreement should have the same effect." 105 S.Ct. at
3428.

Strip"--* 7,000-ecre tract located on the edge of the original
Uintah raaarvation—was diaaatabliahad by the Act of May 24, 1668
(25 Stat. 157)• See, e.g., Uta Indian Tribe, 773 r.2d at 1098
(Seymour, J., concurring).

Compare with district court opinion,

id.y 521 F.Supp. at 1099.

See also panel opinion, id., 716 F.2d

at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting).

As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-

gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in
the Cilsonite Strip. . . .*

Id^, 773 F.2d at 1098.

Yet the

operative provisions concerning the Cilsonite Strip used the same
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus land Act and expressly restored the area "to the public domain" (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157).
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration language contained In the 1902 Uintah Act should be interpreted differently, and there is none.11/
3.

The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds with

the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment
cases.

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of deci-

sions, have consistently recognised that restoration to public
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent
to disestablish.!?/

Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior

18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the understanding of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in
interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute
Indian Tribe, 773 T.2& at 1112.
19. See, e.g.. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Knelp, 521 F.2d 87, 90
(8th Cir. 1975), affd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)} United States ex
rel. Feather v. Erickeon, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom* DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973)1 Beardslee v. United States, 387

to Solem had also assumed that such language vas synonymous with
disestablishment.£Py

The significance these decisions accorded

to restoration to public domain language has a sound historical
foundation and follows veil-established principles regarding
public lands.

See Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106 (Seth, J.,

dissenting).

Long before the acts in question here, it was set-

tled law that when the federal government appropriates or reserves a tract for any purpose, such as an Indian reservation, the
tract is thereby severed from the public domain—that is, it
loses its status as public land.il/

In 1889, for instance, the

19. (Cont'd.) F.2d 280, 285 (8th Cir. 1967); DeMarrias v.
South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963); Russ v. Wilkins,
624 F.2d 914, 915, 924 6 927-29 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 543 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir.
1976). See also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 817 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
1042 (1984); United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 525 F.2d
120, 124 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); and
Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1957).
District court and state court decisions in the disestablishment context have been to the same effect. See, e.g., Puss v.
Wilkins, 410 F.Supp. 579, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 624 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908
(1981); United States ex rel. Condon v."Trickson, 344 F.Supp.
777, 778 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973);
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F.Supp. 1001,
1005 (D. Minn. 1971); Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117, 119
(S.D. 1977); Wood v. Jameson, 130 N.W.2d 95, 99 (S.D. 1964); and
Lafferty v. State, 125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (S.D. 1963).
20. See Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir.
1965); Toolsgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 98, 104 (10th Cir.
1950) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513
(1839); Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad Co. v.
United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co. V. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889); Bardon v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 535, 539 (1892); Spalding
v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1896); Gibson v. Anderson, 131

Supreme Court remarked that:
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully appropriated to any purpose becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands . . • has been
reaffirmed end applied by this court in such a
great number and variety of cases that it may now
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles
underlying the land system of this country.
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co,, 132 U.S. at 360-61.

Contrary

to the en banc majorityfs view, because the reservation of a
tract removed it from the public domain,11/ later restoration of
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reservation status.12/
In sum, the en banc majority1* interpretation not only is
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also

21. (Contfd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v.
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1682); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Atchison, Topeka t Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan.
1881); and United States v. Payne, 8 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark.
1881). "Public domain" and "public lands" traditionally have
been regarded as "equivalent" concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181
U.S. 481, 490 (1901).
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior explained years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation,
"(a)lthough the . . . reservation had been created out of the
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status
of public domain land while included within the reservation. • .
." Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950).
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S.
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain9 . .
•"by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensation was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Executive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kappler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . ." Id. at
330.
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is untenable from an historical perspective.

At the turn of the

century, reservation status and public domain status vere uniformly understood to be mutually exclusive.

In construing res-

toration language as it has, the Tenth Circuit has thus attempted
to "remake history," which the Supreme Court admonished •'cannot"
be done in order to resurrect a reservation that long ago ceased
to exist.

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; accord Rosebud, 430 U.S. et

615.
B.

The Original Uintah Reservation was Disestablished
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended,
and Toc*ay is Comprised Only of the Trust Lands
1.

Governing Principles Support Disestablishment
As discussed above, the en banc majority misread

Solem as changing the Supreme Courtfs analytical test for determining reservation disestablishment, and failed to apply the
proper test when considering the legislation which opened the
Uintah reservation and restored the unallotted lands to the
public domain.

Restoration to public domain language constitutes

firm and unequivocal language for disestablishment (DeCoteau, 420
U.S. at 445-46), and demonstrates "an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment91 (Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 592).
The analysis of the "public domain" language in the 1902 Act
as amended by subsequent acts Is a key part of the analysis to
determine whether or not the reservation was disestablished.

The

en banc majority did not consider this legislation in a manner
consistent with relevant precedents, while the en banc dissent
followed the correct analytical test and reached the correct
result.

Subsection 2 below is an analysis of the legislation

opening the reservation.

It clearly shows s congressional intent

to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and disestablish the reservation.
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under
Solem but also under the Supreme Court's prior decisions.

Sum-

marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem stated that when the
area involved "has long since lost its Indian character, we have
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have
occurred. . . ."

465 U.S. at 471. Thus, "who actually moved

onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . ." Id.
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself
to the teachings of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions.

In

addition to the statutory language, "the 'surrounding circumstances,1 and the 'legislative history9 are to be examined" in
Interpreting surplus land enactments.

Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 5B7.

Accord, s.q., Solem, 465 U.S. mt 469-70. The rscord hare demonstrates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents.

Subsection

3 below reviews these other relevant factors. They vividly demonstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the
functioning of State and local governments.

We now turn to a specific discussion of the legislation,
legislative history, demographics and other circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation.
2.

The Uintah Reservation vas Disestablished Pursuant
to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended
a.

Creation of the Uintah Reservation
The Uintah reservation vas created by President

Abraham Lincoln by Executive Order in 1861 and included the entire area vithin the drainage basin of the Duchesne River, comprising approximately 2,039,040 acres (about 3,186 square miles).
This vas later confirmed by Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 63). The
various bands of the Ute Tribe vere encouraged to move to the
Uintah reservation so they vould finally be settled in a designated area.

See Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1092-1100, tor

a discussion of the creation and early history of the Uintah
reservation.
b.

Early Efforts to Restore Surplus Reservation
Lands to the Public Domain—The 1902 Act
The period around the turn of the century vit-

nessed an active effort by Congress and the President to disestablish large Indian reservations by making individual allotments
to the Indians and then restoring the remaining lands to the
public domain for settlement.

This, Congress hoped, vould

facilitate the assimilation of Indians into the general society.
The Uintah reservation vas not the only reservation vhere the
allotment and surplus program vas instigated; it vas happening in
several other reservations in the West at about the same time

period.

See Ceneral Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-

teau at 432*33; and Solem at 466-67.
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess
of the lands needed to satisfy the allotments to the Indians.
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of Kay 27, 1902 (32 Stat.
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and
included a provision restoring any lands not allotted to the
Indians to the public domain.

The relevant portion of the Act

states:
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable
by an Inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land
to each other member of said tribes, said allotments to be made prior to October first, nineteen
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted
lands within said reservation shall be restored to
the public domain: ". • • (Emphasis added) •
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reservation contained •'public domain99 language which is language "precisely suited" to disestablishment.

DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446.

Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Knelp, 430 U.S. 5B4 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amended to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated
•an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment."
392.

Id. at

See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

An Important observation is that, in 1902, Congress believed
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands

could be allotted and the surplus restored to the public domain
and thus opened to private settlement and entry under the public
land laws. Efforts to obtain the consent of the Indians to allotment were unsuccessful within the time limits met forth in the
1902 Act and Congress was forced to take further action with
regard to opening the Uintah reservation.

However, this task was

made easier by the Supreme Court's decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which held that Congress had exclusive and plenary power to deal with reservation lands, without
the necessity of obtaining the approval or consent of the
Indians.
c.

Action After the 1902 Act
Reacting to the latitude confirmed by the Supreme

Court in Lone Wolf, supra, Congress promptly enacted the Act of
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982), which directed that the Uintah
reservation should be allotted and the surplus lands opened for
settlement and entry under the public land laws.ll/

In 1904 Con-

gress again extended the time for the opening to March 10, 1905,
so that surveying could be completed and allotments made (33
Stat. 207).
In the meantime, on April 27, 1903, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs prepared instructions for United States Indian
Inspector James McLaughlin regarding the opening of the Uintah

24. It is worthy of note that it took Congress fewer than
sixty days following the decision of the Supreme Court In Lone
Wolf in which to mandate the opening of the Uintah reservation
without the consent of the Indians.

_
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reeervation.

The Department of Interior viewed the adminietra-

tiva teak under tha 1903 Act to ba ona of leaking allotments to
tha Indiana and raatoration of tha aurplua lands to tha public
domain aa sat forth in the 1902 Act.

In Kay of 1903, Inspector

McLaughlin met vith the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to
them that the reservation was to be terminated without their conaent and that allotments would be Bade.

The following extract

from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's
underatanding that the reaervation boundaries were to be extinguished (JX 162, pg. 42):
Inspector McLaughlin:
A number of your speakers have said that you do
not want your land stolen from you. My friends,
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all
remain just as they are. There will be no change
in the nature of the country but the improvements
that will come when white people come in among you.
My friends, Red Cap said my talk was cloudy, and
you do not understand it. You are the people who
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the
light. You say that line is very heavy and that
the reservation is nailed down upon the border~
That Is very true as applying to the past many
years and up to now, but congress has provided
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold
down that line and after next year there will be no
outside boundary line to this reservation. (Emphasis added) . « /
d.

Tha Act of March 3, 1905
Tha time set by tha 1904 Act for opening the

reservation (March 10, 1905) was running out.

Early in 1905, the

25. For a mora detailed version of McLaughlin's negotiations
with the Indiana, see JX 162, pp. 42*45. A subsequent report of
McLaughlin, summarizing his meetings with the Utaa, can be found
at LD 101, pp. 9-12.

Department of Interior had not been able to complete surveys of
reservation land In order to make the allotments, mo that the
excess lands could in turn be ascertained and restored to the
public domain.

This delay prompted the Senate, on February 4,

1905, to demand an explanation from the Secretary of the Interior
as to vhy he apparently was not going to meet the March 10 deadline (see ID 101 at p. 1). The Secretary reported promptly,
under date of February 15, 1905, setting forth the progress that
had been made, and explaining, inter alia, that the Department
had experienced difficulty in completing land surveys so that
allotments could be made and this had prevented a timely completion of the allotment program.

He thus made clear the need for

en extension of time in which to complete the allotment program.
Accordingly, by the Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1048),
Congress extended the effective date for terminating the reservation from March 10, 1905, to September 1, 1905. The Act provided
in relevant part:
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such
tracts es may have been set aside as national
forest reserve, end such mineral lands as were disposed of by the ect of Congress of May twentyseventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead end town-site laws of the United States, end
shall be opened to settlement end entry by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall
prescribe the manner in which these lands may be
mettled upon, occupied, end entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof; • • •
That before the opening of the Uintah Indian Reservation the President is hereby authorized to met
apart end reserve as an addition to the Uintah
Forest Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, end
regulations governing forest reserves, end subject
to the mineral rlghte granted by the ect of Congress of Kay twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred end
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two, such portions of the lands within the Uintah
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir
site or other lands necessary to conserve and protect the water supply for the Indians or for
general agricultural development, and may confirm
such rights to water thereon as have already accrued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty,
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with
the provisions of the act opening the reservation.
(Emphasis in original.)
e.

The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts
The en banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33

Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain.
Compare Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12
(Seth, J., dissenting).

That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-

ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding
circumstances.
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act.

Rather, the 1905 Act

contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be disposed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by
proclamation of the President."

But the 1905 Act did not purport

to change whether there should be a disestablishment.
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act.

That had

The 1905 Act merely

addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing disestablishment.

There is no conflict or Inconsistency between the

two.
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The provision in the 1905 Act that the surplus lands were to
be disposed of under the homestead and tovnsits provisions of the
public land lavs certainly does not constitute s restriction to
the declaration in the 1902 Act that the lands were to be restored to the public domain.

The intent of the 1902 Act vas car-

ried over into the 1905 Act.
The circumstances surrounding the Uintah reservation opening
are similar in many respects to those in Rosebud, supra, vhere
the Supreme Court found there to be a diminishment of reservation
boundaries.

In Rosebud, the Court held that the operative lan-

guage of the original act demonstrated "an unmistakable baseline
purpose of disestablishment" (430 U.S. at 592) sven though the
opening of the reservation vas actually implemented by subsequent
legislation.

The same is true for the Uintah reservation legis-

lation in that each later act merely builds on the original act
and deals primarily with extending the time for opening.26/
The legislative history of the 1905 Act, hovever, demonstrates that Congress vas implementing, not abandoning, the 1902
Act's baseline purpose to and the Uintah reservation.

Compare S.

Rep. No. 4240, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., St 14-16 (1905) (letters of
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs and the General Land Office)
vith Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112 (Seth, J., dissenting)
("[n]othing in the Congressional debates suggests an attempt to

26. On this point, the Tenth Circuitfs an banc decision is
contrary to its vievs as expressed in Hanson v. U.S.# 153 F.2d
162 (10th Cir. 1946), vhere it vas concluded that the 1905 Act
merely extended the date of opening and did not alter or affect
the operative terms of the 1902 Act.

change the 1902 intent. • • * ) .

See also, debates at 39 Cong.

Fee. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103).
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other
than e speedy conclusion of the allotment process) was that land
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land.
See "Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry was to
keep the reservation intact*

To the contrary, the pertinent dis-

cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would
still be restored to the public domain.

Senator Teller, one of

the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings:
"I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land
if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at
30) (emphasis added).

Further, there is nothing in the congres-

sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uintah reservation.
The real purpose end intent of the 1905 Act was not only to
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public domain as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite
laws in order to prevent speculation.

Limitations on entry such

as those contained in the 1905 Act ere not inconsistent with the
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands
to the public domain end disestablish the reservation.
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Again,

the cumulative series of sets in this case can be compared to
those in Rosebud where the Supreme Court held there to be a
disestablishment.

Rosebud at 592.

That the 1905 Act carried the 1902 Act into effect is further
clearly demonstrated by the Presidential Proclamation opening the
original Uintah reservation for entry and settlement.

The Presi-

dential Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), employing
much the same format as that used in the 1904 Rosebud Proclamation, provided:
Whereas it was provided by the Act of Congress,
approved May 27, • • • 1902 (32 Stat., 263), among
other things, that on October first, 1903, the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in
the State of Utah, "shall be restored to the public
domain; • • . ."
And, whereas, the time for the opening of said
unallotted lands was extended to October 1, 1904,
by the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1903 (32
Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10, 1905, by
the Act of Congress approved April 21, 1904 (33
Stat., 207), and was again extended to not later
than September 1, 1905, by the Act of Congress,
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat-, 1069), which last
named act provided, among other things:
[The Act is here quoted]
Mow, therefore, I . . . do hereby declare . . .
that all the unallotted lands in said reservation,
excepting such as have at that time been reserved
. . ., and such mineral lands as may have been
disposed of . . ., will on and after the 28th day
of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry,
settlement, and disposition under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the
United States. . . .
34 Stat, at 3119-20 (emphasis added).
The President thus clearly understood that the 1905 Act was
implementing—not deviating from—the purpose of disestablishment
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underlying the 1902 Act.

The 1905 Proclamation le similar to the

one involved in Roeebud end conetitutee en "unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement, by the Nation's Chief Executive of a perceived disestablishment. • ,» (Id., 430 U.S. at 602-03), and
unmistakably reflecte the intent of Congress.

See id. at 603.

On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent.
3.

Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment
In addition to examining the legislation opening a

reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component
of its "fairly clean analytical structure" is to examine the
subsequent history of the area:
On a more pragmatic level, ve have recognized
that vho actually moved onto opened reservation
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion
of a reservation and the area has long since lost
its Indian character, ve have acknowledged that de
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra,
at 5B8, n 3, and 604*605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct
1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to
de facto diminishment, ve look to the subsequent
demographic history of opened lands as one additional clue as to vhat Congress expected vould hap*
pen once land on a particular reservation vas
opened to non-Indian settlers.
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
The Court further noted that:
When an area is predominately populated by nonIndians vith only e few surviving pockets of Indian
allotmente, finding that the land remains Indian
Country seriously burdens the administration of
State and local governments.
Solem at 471, n.12.

In

Roaebud, the Court stated:
The fact that naithar Congrees nor tha DepartBant of Indian Affaira haa aought to axarciaa its
authority ovar thia area, or to challanga tha
State's axarciae of authority, ia a factor antitled
to vaight aa a part of tha "jurisdictional history." The long-standing assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an araa that ia over 90%
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not
only demonstrates the parties9 understanding of the
meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable
expectations which should not be upset by ao
strained a reading of the Acts. • .

Rossbud, 430 U.S. at 604-05. We will now briefly examine several
additional factora which strongly support disestablishment.
a.

Subsequent Administrative and Congressional
Recognition of Termination
The 1905 Presidential Proclamation, discussed

supra, which opened the reservation, does not stand alone in its
reference that the surplus lands were restored to the public doBain.

The understanding of other responsible government offi-

cials has, until recent years, consistently mirrored President
Roosevelt's construction.12/

Many of the documents cited in the

27• See, e.g., Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs to the Secretary of Interior, dated May 11, 1905, at 3
(JX 463); Letter of the Acting Secretary of Interior, dated September 3, 1909; Letter of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office to Senator Reed Smoot, dated December 20, 1909; Letter of
the Secretary of Interior to Senator Reed Smoot, dated January
12, 1911; H.R. Doc. No. 892, 62d Cong., 2d Seas., at 1-2 (1912)
(Joint Report of Inspector James McLaughlin and the Chief Supervisor) ; H.R. Doc. No. 1250, 63d Cong., 3d Sees., at 1-2 (1914)
(Letter of the Secretary); Letter of the Commissioner of the
Canaral Land Office to the Commissioner of Indian Affaira, dated
September 26, 1922, at 1 (JX 403); Letter of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated December 1, 1927, at 2; 54 I.D. 559, 561-62
(1934) (JX 431); Solicitor Opinion M-33626, at 2 (Auguat 3,
1944); Secretarial Order, 10 Fed. Reg. 12409 (1945) (LD 183); 59
2.D. 393 (1947); Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 1-2, 5 (December
7, 1950); Appeal of Edward M. Brown, A-26523, at 1-2 (December

margin expressly recognire that, vith respect to the original
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands were restored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act.
The record shows as veil that officials of the Interior Department treated the original Uintah reservation as having been
disestablished.

Thus, with the opening of the reservation in

1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the
original area as the "former" reservation.

For decades after the

opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the
trust lends (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status)
as the Tribe's existing reservation,28/ a practice that continued
until recently.il/

27. (Cont'd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Consales, at 1
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920
(1971) (LD 210).
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1,
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc.
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 4 6
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior).
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Ass't. Attorney General).
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S.
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah &
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Crazing Report, at 1, 3
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior);
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations
In Arizona, Nevada t Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 480).

Subsequent legislation and other congressional materials are
to the ease effect.12/

Numerous congressional documents subse-

quent to the 1905 opening contain references to the "former"
reservation.

See for example, Senate Report No. 219, 61st Cong.

2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1910 (LD 138) entitled "Making Available Lands
On Former Uintah Indian Reservation," (emphasis added).11/
It should be noted that these numerous and repeated references in congressional documents were consistent with the policy of
the day of disestablishing Indian reservations and assimilating
the Indians into society.

30. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 196; S. Rep.
No. 139, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 291,
59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); S. Rep. No. 893, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 1*2 (1912); H.R. Rep. No. 943, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 1-2 (1912); S. Rep. No. 979, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-2
(1926); H.R. Rep. No. 2047, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1927);
and 74 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1931). Characteristic of Congress1
treatment is the Act of July 20, 1912, which provided that:
any person who has heretofore made a homestead entry for
land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian
Reservation in the State of Utah, authorized by the Act
approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two,
and Acts amendatory thereto. . . .
37 Stat. 196 (emphasis added).
603, n.25.

See also Rosebud, 430 U.S. at

31. For other past tense references to the "former" reservation, see: Congressional Floor Debates, Jan. 15, 1906, p. 1064
(LD 116); Senate Bill 321, Jan. 27, 1906 (LD 120); H.R. Rep. No.
823, Feb. 9, 1906 (LD 122); 6. Rep. No. 2561—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 131, April 13, 1906 (LD 124); S. Rep. No. 4263,
June 12, 1906 (LD 126); Public Lav 258 (H.R. 15331, pp. 375*76)
June 21, 1906 (LD 127)} H.R. Rap. No. 5010, June 25, 1906 (LD
128); Senate Bill 6375 (P.L. 345) June 29, 1906 (LD 129); P.L.
104—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 95, April 30, 1908 (LD 135);
P.L. 144—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 285, April 4, 1910 (LD
139); P.L. 434—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 1074, Kerch 31,
1911 (LD 141); P.L. 717, 70 Stat. 546, 548, July 14, 1956 (LD
203).
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Judicial pronouncements also follow suit.

In decisions ren-

dered prior to Ute Indian Trlbef the courts interpreted the 1905
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.ll/ Indeed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v.
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc
majority--that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original
Uintah reservation vere "restored to the public domain by the Act
of May 27, 1902. . . ."

Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court

likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to
the public domain under these Acts.

Sovards, 108 P. at 1114.

Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the Tribe's reservation vas considered to be only
those lands held in trust by the federal government.

Affiliated

Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972).
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation
remains intact, the en banc majority has created vhat must be one
of the fev—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a national forest.

The district court and the panel of the court of

appeals agreed that such an anomaly vas not intended and that the
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048,
1069*70, vhich set aside more than 1 million acres •as an addition to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the lavs, rules and
regulations governing forest reserves,11 thereby diminished the

32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah
and White~Rlver Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 ft 21-22;
United States v. Boss, 160 P. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and
Sovards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910).

original Uintah reservation.
14.

Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313-

The en banc majority thought, incorrectly, that under SoleTn

the transfer of the administration of these one million acres
from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture and
the fact that Congress later compensated the Tribe for its interest in the forest lands were not inconsistent with continued
reservation status.

Despite the fact, as the federal district

court stated, that the "status and purpose of national forest
lands are distinct from the status and purpose of Indian reservations" (Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp at 1138), the en banc
majority apparently believed that under Solem this could be ignored and that the Tribe therefore had jurisdiction within the
national forest (Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090).

There is,

however, nothing in the Courtfs Solem opinion that justifies such
an extraordinary result.

Congress clearly ended the original

Uintah reservation on the land withdrawn for a national forest,
which further demonstrates its intent to disestablish the reservation itself.
The United States supported the Ute Tribe as amicus curiae in
the recent federal litigation with respect to the Uintah reservation.

In so doing, the United States failed to acknowledge the

inconsistency of that position with its position in other litigation involving this reservation.

In Uintah and White River Bands

of Ute Indians v. United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1 (1957), it entered
into a stipulation with which the Court of Claims agreed (139
Ct.Cl. at 5*6, 22) which quoted the 1902 Act end then succinctly
stated the critical point:

•Pursuant to this [1902] Act and

amendments thereto, • . • allotments in severalty . . . . were
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands . .
. . vere restored to the public domain, and opened for disposition under the public land lavs for the benefit of the Indians11
(emphasis added).

What is more, the United States (and the Utes)

consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah
reservation vas a former reservation; and throughout its opinion
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uintah reservation as having ended.
56, 64, 69 and 70.

E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28f

It is also worthy of note that when the Ute

Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it
up veil:

"Nov, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of

particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as
amended under which the Uintah Reservation was ultimately broken

up."22/
b.

Subsequent Demographic History Supports
Disestablishment
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-

strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local governments in a myriad of areas. The disputed area "lost its Indian
character" long ago.

It is "predominantly populated by non-

33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and
White River Band of Utes v. U.S., Ho. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954).

• as —

Indiana,•» approximately 18,000 of than,11/ with only about 1,500
tribal members, who are living mainly on trust lands. Ute Indian
Tribe, 773 r.2d at 1105 (Seth, J.# dissenting).

The non-Indians

are the ones "who actually moved onto the opened reservation
lands" and have been there ever since.

Thus, there has indeed

been a de facto or de jure disestablishment.

It is their "jus-

tifiable expectations," built up over a 60-year period, that
would be upset if it were to be held that the original boundaries
are still intact and it la their interests the en banc majority
ignored, despite the United States Supreme Court's command that
such factors must be taken into account.

E.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S.

at 605; and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
Under the en banc majorityfs result, the Ute Tribe would preside over an area owned and predominantly populated by nonIndians and, hence, in which the Tribe has little presence and no
real interest as a sovereign.

At the same time, State and local

authority would be significantly limited despite the fact that
this area has principally been the concern and responsibility of
these governments, not the Tribe.

This would include Increased

tribal court jurisdiction over all residents of the area, and
diminished state court jurisdiction.
The testimony and exhibits Introduced in the federal district
court clearly establish that the State and its local governmental
divisions had exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic

34. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, General
Population Characteristics Utah, Table 15, p. 46-12 (1980).

reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust
lands.

The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area

shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the
lavs of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding
trust lands).11/

For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-

intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 3B0), it
was stated as follows:
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction
over their persons. Where offences have been cornBitted against the lavs of the State, the natter
has been reported to the County authorities and the
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with
the County authorities in the maintenance of lav
and order.
Id. at 2-3.

Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that

the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area beginning in the early 1900*i.21/
The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State
and local officials introduced at the federal district court trial.

This testimony shows that until recently the State continued

*5. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380
at 2} JX 366 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399
at 2i JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420.
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78
(testimony of Ceorge Karett, Sheriff of Duchesne County).
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to exercise primary jurisdiction vithln the historic reservation
area, except on the trust lands.22/
The evidence introduced in this case regarding the exercise
of jurisdictional authority by the Tribe also confirms that the
State and local governmental subdivisions have, until recently,
exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area, except on the trust lands.ll/
Finally, until recently the Ute Tribe itself treated only the
trust lands as the Tribe's post-1905 reservation.11/

A3 the dis-

sent in Ute Indian Tribe observed:
Statements made by the Utes themselves also tend to detract from their position. For example, the 1957 Ute
Ten Year Development Program provides a description of
the total acreage of the Uintah and Ouray reservation as
currently containing 1,010,000 acres. . . .
773 F.2d at 1114.

37. See Trial Tr. at 106 (testimony of Clair Huff, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 121 (testimony of Norman Hancock,
Division of Wildlife Resources); 158-59 (testimony of David
Thomas, Division of Wildlife Resources); 186-87 (testimony of
Edward Tuttle, Utah Division of Parks and Recreation); 220 (testimony of Donald Smith, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 251
(testimony of C. Blake Felght, Utah Division of Oil, Gas &
Mining); 267, 270-74, 277-79 and 281-89 (testimony of George
Marett, Duchesne County Sheriff); and 298-99 (testimony of Ray
Wardle, member and Chief of Tribal Police, cross-deputized by
Uintah County).
38. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 121 and 135 (testimony of Norman
Hancock); 159 (testimony of David Thomas); 174 (testimony of Gordon Harmston, Utah Department of Natural Resources); 187 (testimony of Edward Tuttle); 228 (testimony of Charles East); 251
(testimony of C. Blake Feight); 262-63 (testimony of Alfred Parriette, Tribefs Division of Wildlife Management and Lav Enforcement)} end 294-300 (testimony of Ray Wardle).
39. See, e.g., 1957 Ute Ten-Year Development Program, at 6668 (JX 465); 1966 Review and Revision of the Uintah & Ouray
Indian Reservation-Wide Program, et 7, 8; and 1969 Annual Report
of the Uintah Indian Tribe, at 1 (JX 473).

Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that
they vere entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.91
These signs vere clearly intended to designate vhat the Tribe
thought vere the reservation boundaries.

The signs have been

replaced from time to time over the years (vith the signs in more
recent times being more elaborate), but they have always indicated that the boundaries of the trust lands vere the reservation
boundaries. £2/
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dispute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians,
and has lost Its Indian character virtually from the opening of
the reservation in 1905.
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances surrounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the conclusion must be that the reservation vas disestablished and the
surplus lands vhlch vere restored to the public domain are not
part of the reservation—nor do they constitute Indian country as

40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr.
155*5?) end Cordon Karmston (Tr. 176-77)• A series of photographa of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such
signs appeared on Kerch 22, 1977, vere introduced at trial as Ex.
I-4B, coordinated vith Ex. I-4A, indicating the precise locations
vhere the various photographs vere taken.

defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151. Therefore, the state district court
had jurisdiction in this matter.

